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N Bogan v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit held that in § 1983
civil actions for unreasonable search, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the absence of exigent circumstances.' The Fourth Amend-
ment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."'2 In Kentucky v.
King, the Supreme Court maintained the long-recognized notion that
warrantless searches within a home are "presumptively unreasonable,"
but that presumption can be overcome by the existence of exigent cir-
cumstances. 3 The Court has identified certain circumstances that qualify
as "exigent."'4 Though declining to define the scope of exigent circum-
stances, the Court stressed that exceptions to warrantless searches should
be "few in number and carefully delineated."' 5 While lower courts have
respected this limitation by placing a high burden on the government to
prove the existence of exigent circumstances at the time of the search,
6
the Seventh Circuit recently held in Bogan v. City of Chicago that the
standard should be shifted in civil cases, placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiff to prove the absence of exigent circumstances. 7 This burden
shift effectively widens the intentionally narrow exception to warrantless
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1. Bogan v. City of Chicago, 644 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 2011).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
3. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).
4. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (fire); United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot pursuit of a felon); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
770-71 (1966) (destruction of evidence).
5. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984).
6. See Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir.
2010); Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 764 (9th Cir. 2009); Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp.,
461 F.3d 646, 655 (6th Cir. 2006).
7. Bogan v. City of Chicago, 644 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 2011).
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searches and could lead to plaintiffs' inability to seek redress after appar-
ent Fourth Amendment violations.
On May 9, 2009, two Chicago police officers, Breen and Langley, re-
sponded to a domestic battery call at an apartment building.8 Upon ar-
riving at the apartment, they followed the sound of a woman's screams to
the roof of the building where they found a woman in distress. 9 "She
explained that her boyfriend, Antonio Pearson, . . . had beaten and
choked her." 10 While trying to find a way into the apartment, where they
believed Pearson to be, they spotted and made eye contact with an Afri-
can-American male who immediately fled from the bedroom to the back
of the apartment.11 The officers entered the apartment through the win-
dow, but, while searching, received a message that there was a black male
on the back porch of the building. 12 The officers left the apartment and
proceeded across the hall to a closed door.13 Finding the door locked,
they tried to kick the door down before Ms. Bogan opened it.14 By the
time Bogan had opened the door, there were already ten to twelve of-
ficers in her apartment who had apparently entered through the back
door.' 5 The officers conducted a search but did not find Pearson. 16
Ms. Bogan filed an action alleging that the officers "violated her Fourth
Amendment rights by entering and searching her apartment without a
warrant. '17 The district court clarified that, although violations of Fourth
Amendment rights are governed by an objective standard, subjective evi-
dence (concerning the officer's subjective beliefs about the suspect) is still
relevant.18 At the close of evidence, the district court gave the jury in-
structions on the hot pursuit exception, stating that "a police officer may
enter a person's home if, under all circumstances, a reasonable officer
would believe that the entry is necessary to prevent the escape of a per-
son who is suspected of a crime and there is insufficient time to obtain a
search warrant."1 9 The court further instructed that it was Ms. Bogan's
responsibility to "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a rea-
sonable officer in the defendant's position would not have believed that a
crime suspect was in Ms. Bogan's home."'20
The jury returned a verdict for the police officers and the district court
entered judgment for the officers after denying Bogan's motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law.2 ' Bogan appealed, maintaining that the district
8. Id. at 565-66.















court's jury instructions constituted reversible error because she did not
have the burden of proving the absence of exigent circumstances but, in-
stead, the officers had the burden to prove the existence of such
circumstances. 22
The Fourth Amendment requires the presence of a warrant, obtained
with proof of probable cause, before searches and seizures of private
property can occur. 23 Absent probable cause and exigent circumstances,
a warrantless search is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.2 4 The Su-
preme Court has not defined the scope of the exigent circumstances ex-
ception, specifying only that exceptions should be "few in number and
carefully delineated," but has recognized a few emergency situations
where the exception applies. 25 Among these "hot pursuit" exceptions are
pursuit of a felon, destruction of evidence, and ongoing fire.26 The exi-
gency exception derives largely from the police investigatory process, al-
lowing police to enter without a warrant when they have "probable cause
to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and a reasonable
belief that their entry is 'necessary to prevent ... the destruction of rele-
vant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence im-
properly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts."' 27 The Court
consistently places paramount importance on the protection of privacy
provided by the Fourth Amendment and has held "that searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasona-
ble." s28 In criminal cases, courts require the government to bear the
"heavy burden" of proving the existence of exigent circumstances that
allow the police to enter and search without a warrant.29 Of the few civil
cases that present this issue, most have respected the limited nature of the
exception and held that the government still bears this "heavy burden. 30
The Seventh Circuit in Bogan v. City of Chicago held that in a § 1983
civil action for warrantless searches in which the defendants claim that
exigent circumstances justify the warrantless search, the plaintiff has the
burden to prove the absence of exigent circumstances. 31 The court
looked to its previous decision in Valance v. Wisel, which held that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof in civil warrantless search actions
when the defendants claim that consent gave them justification for a war-
22. Id. at 568.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).
25. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984).
26. Id. at 750.
27. Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 763 (9th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).
28. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856. See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-33
(1886).
29. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50.
30. See Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir.
2010); Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 766-67, 769; Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp., 461 F.3d 646, 655 (6th
Cir. 2006); Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996).
31. Bogan v. City of Chicago, 644 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 2011).
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rantless search.32 In coming to that conclusion, the court followed a Sec-
ond Circuit decision which placed the burden on the plaintiffs because it
was in line with the nature of civil cases in which the burden of persua-
sion "must remain squarely on the plaintiff in accordance with estab-
lished principles governing civil trials. ' 33 The Seventh Circuit focused on
the procedural aspects of civil cases, recognizing that warrantless searches
are "presumptively unreasonable," but that the presumption only re-
quires the defendant to raise some evidence of the existence of exigent
circumstances in order to move forward. 34 The court reasoned that the
presumption does not shift the burden to the defendant to disprove an
element of the plaintiff's case.35
The issue of burden of proof in civil warrantless search actions where
the defendant justifies the search by claiming the existence of exigent cir-
cumstances was a matter of first impression for the Seventh Circuit.36
The court had previously considered the burden of proof issue in warrant-
less searches only when the defendant asserted that the searched party
consented to the search (an exception different and separate from the
exigent circumstances exception). 37 Ms. Bogan distinguished exigent cir-
cumstances cases from Valance, a consent case, by pointing out that plain-
tiffs in a consent case have knowledge of whether consent was given
freely or as a result of duress or coercion.38 In exigent circumstances
cases, the knowledge of exigent circumstances is "uniquely within the
knowledge of the pursuing officers. '39 The Seventh Circuit was not per-
suaded by her reasoning, noting that its reasoning in Valance did not rely
on whether knowledge was uniquely available to one party.40 The court
also looked to other Fourth Amendment cases, which held that the plain-
tiff bears the burden to prove the absence of probable cause if he believes
the arresting officers did not have probable cause to arrest him.41 The
court likened that situation to this one because the existence of probable
cause "is wholly dependent upon the facts known to the officer," just as
the facts of exigent circumstances should be known only to the officer.42
Bogan then argued that extending the rationale used in Valance to this
case would create a split among the circuits.43 The court acknowledged
the split among the circuits, but quickly dismissed the argument by stating
that the split already existed before Valance, so a divisive decision in this
32. Id. at 568; Valence v. Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269, 1279 (7th Cir. 1997).
33. Valance, 110 F.3d at 1278 (citing Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558, 563 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
34. Bogan, 644 F.3d at 568.
35. Id. at 569.
36. Id. at 568.
37. Id. (referring to Valance, 110 F.3d at 1278).








case would not create any new split.44 The court then tossed aside Bo-
gan's supporting cases by stating that even though those courts held that
the government bears the burden to prove the existence of exigent cir-
cumstances, they did so without discussion of their reasoning and, there-
fore, were not persuasive.4 5
The court incorrectly held that the burden of proof in a § 1983 warrant-
less search action in which the defendants claim the existence of exigent
circumstances as a defense belongs to the plaintiff, because the court er-
roneously relied on cases with fact patterns distinguishable from the case
at issue and the holding is inconsistent with the reasoning behind the re-
striction of warrantless search exceptions. The court incorrectly relied on
Valance for support because Valance required a plaintiff to bear the bur-
den of proof using facts that he had within his knowledge, a situation
inapposite to the case at bar.46 The court's dismissal of Bogan's argument
was simply based on the fact that the court in Valance did not discuss
which party had access to the facts needed to prove consent 47-implying
that if a court foregoes discussion of an issue in one case, that issue must
be irrelevant in later cases. Though consent is one of the warrantless
search exceptions, 48 it is not the same as the exigent circumstances excep-
tion. Just because knowledge of facts was not discussed in a case examin-
ing the consent exception does not make it irrelevant to the exigent
circumstances situation. Ironically, this absent-discussion argument that
the court relies on to bolster support is the same argument it uses to un-
dermine the cases Bogan uses as support. The court summarily dismissed
cases that required the government to bear the burden of proving the
existence of exigent circumstances simply because the courts did not pro-
vide discussion to back up the decisions.49 This decision is inconsistent
with the analysis the court used in Valance.
The Seventh Circuit also wrongly used McBride v. Grice, a case that
assigned the burden to prove the absence of probable cause to the plain-
tiff, to support its argument that the burden to prove the absence of exi-
gent circumstances should be on the plaintiff.50 That case looked at the
allegedly wrongful arrest of a storeowner after he physically removed an
employee from his store.5' The Supreme Court's primary reason for re-
stricting the exigent circumstances exception, namely that "physical entry
of the home is the chief evil against which ... the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed, ' '5 2 is not even relevant to the McBride case. The
court also wrongly discounted civil cases that use criminal cases as sup-
44. Id.
45. Id. at 569-70.
46. Id. at 569.
47. Id.
48. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
49. Bogan, 644 F.3d at 569-70.
50. Id. at 569.
51. McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2009).
52. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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port.53 The Supreme Court has consistently held that "warrantless felony
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent
probable cause and exigent circumstances. " 54 The Supreme Court does
not distinguish homes of felons from homes of innocent civilians. If po-
tential felons have the privilege to protect the sanctity of their homes
(absent the government's ability to reach the high burden of proving the
existence of exigent circumstances), there is no reason to support the con-
clusion that civilians do not have the same protection. Furthermore, the
Seventh Circuit's recognition of the circuit split in regard to "the burden
of proof applicable to § 1983 unconstitutional false arrest claims" 55 ig-
nores the fact that the cited circuit-splitting cases concern different ele-
ments of a false arrest claim. The cases that split the circuit opinions deal
with issues of consent (an exception under the control of the home-
owner) 56 or deal with only probable cause, 57 and therefore, should not be
relied upon to determine issues regarding exigent circumstances. 58
The Seventh Circuit's holding is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
motivation to limit the situations where exigent circumstances make war-
rantless searches reasonable because it could lead to a situation where a
plaintiff alleging violation of his civil rights is left without the ability to
prove his case and, in effect, defend those civil rights. The spirit of the
Fourth Amendment is to give protective rights to citizens. If a plaintiff
has no access to the facts used to justify warrantless entry, he is left with
no means to protect his basic Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly,
knowing that a resident often has no knowledge of the facts used by a
police officer to justify entrance to the home, a police officer could then
enter the home knowing that the resident has little means of redress. The
narrowly-defined exigent circumstances exception should be viewed as a
recognition of the rare circumstances that could permit warrantless entry
into a home, not as a broad right given to the government to enter homes
without warrant. Supreme Court Justice Bradley's admonition on the
preservation of constitutional rights over a century ago best illustrates the
importance of protecting the high standard to prove exigent
circumstances:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repul-
sive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight devi-
ations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by
adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of
person and property should be liberally construed. A close and lit-
eral construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound
53. See Bogan, 644 F.3d at 570.
54. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984).
55. Bogan, 644 F.3d at 569.
56. See Truluck v. Frech, 275 F.3d 391, 401 (4th Cir. 2001).
57. See Davis v. Rodriguez, 364 F.3d 424, 432-33 (2d Cir. 2004).
58. Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (1996).
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than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the con-
stitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroach-
ments thereon.59
The Seventh Circuit's literal construction of burdens of proof in civil
cases is exactly the type of silent approach that leads to the "gradual de-
preciation of the right" that Justice Bradley speaks of.60
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Bogan v. City of Chicago could lead to
diminished constitutional rights for plaintiffs who have been subjected to
warrantless searches of their homes without the presence of exigent cir-
cumstances. The court relies solely on traditional civil procedure notions
without regard to constitutional rights and relies on cases that are only
tangentially relevant to the case at issue to make its decision. The burden
to prove the existence of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless
search should remain with the government in order to preserve the indi-
vidual protections provided by the Fourth Amendment.
59. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
60. See id.
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